The markets for technology expand the strategy space for innovators, enabling them to consider technology licensing as a potential source of revenue. The extant literature on technology markets highlights the importance of intellectual property (IP) rights for the functioning of these markets. However, the empirical evidence on the role that IP rights play in facilitating the functioning of technology markets is limited. To address this gap, this paper exploits a shift in the patentability of human genes and contributes novel evidence, confirming the importance of IP rights for markets for technology. Specifically, this study employs a difference-in-difference framework to estimate the causal impact of gene patents' invalidation on technology licensing rates. I find the invalidation of gene patents to have a strong, persistent, and negative impact on the annual technology licensing deals of the affected organizations. Building on the Market Design literature, I provide evidence of the heterogeneity of this impact across different therapeutic markets.
INTRODUCTION
The market for technology plays a critical role in innovation and economic growth. The prior foundational body of work on this market has established its importance in enabling innovative firms to commercialize their innovations through cooperative arrangements with established firms and generate revenues through licensing their technologies (Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 2001; Gans & Stern, 2003) . Markets for technology are reportedly large and expanding. Robbins (2006) and Arora and Gambardella (2010) estimate that the US income from technology licensing was approximately $50 billion in 2002, which shows considerable growth since the mid-1990s when this income was estimated at about $25-35 billion (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001 ).
Theoretical works on the markets for technologies and ideas underline the importance of strong intellectual property (IP) rights regime for these markets to function (Teece, 1986; Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Gans & Stern, 2003) . Strong IP rights, particularly patents, allow innovative firms to protect their inventions against expropriation hazards. They address the information asymmetry problems, such as the paradox of disclosure (Arrow, 1962) and moral hazard (Arora, 1986) , that may arise during licensing negotiations, and thus increase the likelihood of reaching licensing agreements. Although the importance of IP rights for technology markets is theoretically established, the empirical evidence to support it is limited. In particular, we have little evidence at the firm level to confirm the impact of patent rights on technology licensing activities.
In this study, I address this gap by exploiting an unexpected shift in the patentability of genomic compounds and estimating its impact on the firm-level technology licensing activities. In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered verdict in Association of Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics (hereafter the "Myriad case"). As part of the decision, the Court unexpectedly declared that isolated genes are parts of nature and therefore are ineligible for patent protection.
According to the American Medical Association, the ruling invalidated proprietary rights to over 6,000 genes in humans alone. My empirical strategy in this paper is to identify organizations that owned such gene patents at the time of the ruling and examine the impact of this patent loss on their technology licensing deals. To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, I match these organizations with a group of similar organizations with no gene patents and employ a difference-in-difference framework to estimate this impact. Further, I use insights from the Market Design literature (Roth, 2007 (Roth, , 2008 Gans & Stern, 2010) to explore the heterogeneity of treatment effects across different markets.
Consistent with the theoretical arguments, I find evidence of a strong impact of patents on technology licensing. Following the invalidation of gene patents, the technology licensing rates of gene patent owner organizations decreases significantly relative to similar organizations with no gene patents. The impact is persistent during the four years after the Myriad case and is more salient for the organizations with larger shares of gene patents. Moreover, the impact is stronger across the gene-related therapeutic markets, although not always statistically significant. This study contributes novel empirical evidence to the literature on technology markets.
To my knowledge, this is the first large-scale empirical study to provide evidence on the causal impact of patents on technology licensing rates at the organization level. My empirical approach consists of a sudden and surprising exogenous shock, careful consideration of a relevant control group, and novel detailed data on technology licensing deals -an outcome variable often characterized by data scarcity. My findings suggest a strong connection between a firm's patent portfolio and its ability to engage in technology markets to license its technologies. I observe this connection in various relevant therapeutic markets.
In addition, my findings speak to a set of recent high-profile policy shifts in patenteligibility of a variety of subject matters (e.g the US Supreme Court's decisions on Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International) . As reported by Caulfield et al. (2013) , in several cases, the needed empirical evidence is lacking and the policy is informed by speculations and anecdotes. Five years after the Myriad case, I shed light on one of its impacts on the life sciences industries. Through a careful analysis of cooperative agreements among biopharmaceutical firms, this study reports a decrease in the technology licensing rates, after the invalidation of gene patents. This paper joins the few other works that explore the impact of the Myriad case on different aspects of business and innovation in biopharmaceuticals (Aboy et al., 2016; .
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on Markets for Technologies and Ideas. Section 3 presents the setting, data, and empirical methodology, while Section 4 reports the results. In Section 5, I describe limitations of the study and potential avenues for future research. Section 6 concludes.
THEORY Patents and the Technology Markets
Markets for technology facilitate revenue generation through technology licensing for innovative firms. A well-functioning technology market enlarges the strategy space for innovators:
instead of, or along with, making investments in commercializing innovations and entering the markets for products, firms can license out their technologies and leave the commercialization part to the incumbents that own the necessary commercialization resources. The efficiency created by technology trades allows firms to focus either on innovation or commercialization. This ideally creates an industry-wide division of labor where R&D specialists generate innovations and incumbents commercialize them. Pisano (1991) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001) document evidence of such vertical disintegrations in the biopharmaceutical and semiconductor sectors, respectively.
The Market for Technology literature contends that whether firms choose a cooperative commercialization strategy and sell/buy technologies or vertically integrate the R&D and enter the product markets depends on three main factors: the strength of intellectual property (IP) rights regime, the negotiation costs between inventors and incumbents, and the importance and accessibility of the complementary assets required for commercialization (Teece, 1986; Gans & Stern, 2003) . Cooperative commercialization is a more viable option when complementary assets are essential and difficult to access, bargaining costs between inventors and incumbents are low, and a strong IP rights regime is in place (Gans et al., 2002) .
The mechanisms through which each factor affects technology markets are theoretically well-established. Firstly, the role of IP rights in facilitating cooperative commercialization can be explained by the notion of the paradox of disclosure (Arrow, 1962; Anton & Yao,1994) . Simply stated, the more a potential buyer knows about the idea, the more her willingness-to-pay is.
However, more disclosure of the idea can raise the risk of expropriation. Strong IP rights regimes help innovators safeguard their ideas, mitigate the frictions introduced by expropriation hazards, and motivate firms to engage in cooperative arrangements more actively. Moreover, by owning IP rights on innovation, the technology licensor can disclose her technology to several potential licensees, play them against each other, license the technology to the highest bidder, and earn higher profits from technology licensing (Gans & Stern, 2003) . Such a setting can also motivate the established firms to license in technologies. When patent rights are enforced, licensors often negotiate under the "shadow of competition", i.e., one of their bargaining chips is to threat market entry as a competitor (Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2002) . Deciding between having a collaborator or a competitor, the established firms have more incentives to reach a cooperative agreement.
Secondly, the complementary assets that are costly to build, such as regulatory expertise and brand recognition, can increase the relative likelihood of cooperation as well. Instead of sinking sizable costs to replicate the needed complementary assets, it could be much less costly for an innovator to license out her technology and leave the commercialization with the incumbent owner of complementary assets. Finally, bargaining costs can shape a firm's decision to cooperate or compete. When bargaining costs are low, for instance in the cases where there exist reliable intermediaries to match buyers and sellers and evaluate the technology, forging agreements is easier, which increases the likelihood of cooperative commercialization via markets for technology.
Empirical studies suggest that opposing conditions can create frictions in the technology markets. Based on a survey of venture-backed and SBIR-backed startups, Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002) provide evidence of more cooperation when the three conditions, i.e., strong IP rights regime, difficult to build complementary assets, and low bargaining cost, are satisfied. In their following work, Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2008) examine the timing of cooperation and demonstrate that the licensing occurs earlier when the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) alleviates the uncertainty around patenting of innovations. Their study sheds light on a new aspect of patents' role in cooperative commercialization: accelerating the licensing process. Chatterji and Fabrizio (2016) take a different approach and investigate the role of bargaining costs in technology markets.
They document evidence of a sudden increase in the negotiation costs between innovators and incumbents in the orthopedic sector of medical devices, leading to a decrease in the cooperative commercialization of innovation in this sector.
Although the theoretical arguments of the Market for Technology (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001 ) and Idea (Gans & Stern, 2003) literature mainly revolve around firm-level strategies to cooperate in the technology markets or compete in the product markets, the empirical studies have been primarily focused on the decision to produce or license, at the innovation level (Chatterji & Fabrizio's (2016) study is a notable exception). Specifically, the extant literature provides little evidence on how owning IP rights, most notably patents, shape a firm's strategy to commercialize cooperatively, in the form of technology licensing, or to enter the competition, in the form of product market entry.
Building on the prior works, therefore, the present study aims to address this gap. In the context of the sudden invalidation of gene patents, I predict the technology licensing activities of the firms with larger shares of invalidated gene patents in their portfolios to decrease. Following the partial invalidation of their patent portfolios, these firms not only lose some of their bargaining chips, but face a higher risk of being expropriated. In a similar vein, established firms also have less incentive to forge licensing deals with the owners of invalidated patents. In the words of a licensing director for a large pharmaceutical company, "Patents are critical for start-up firms.
Without patents, we won't even talk to a start-up about licensing" (Walsh, Arora, Cohen, 2003) .
I, therefore, expect to observe a decrease in the licensing rates of firms with a large gene patent share at the time of the Myriad case.
Structural Market Characteristics and the Technology Markets
A related body of scholarship on Markets for Technology underlines the market characteristics that may influence the commercialization modes that innovative firms choose.
Drawing on the Transaction Cost Economics literature (Williamson, 1975; Coase, 1937 ), Pisano (1990 , for instance, posits that the small number of R&D specialists in a therapeutic market decreases the alternative choices for pharmaceutical firms and encourages them to internalize R&D, instead of licensing technologies from biotechnology firms. Thus, a smaller market size, he argues, could be associated with lower technological licensing rates. Including competition in his model, Fosfuri (2006) asserts that the relationship between market size and technology licensing rates is inverted-U shaped. The presence of multiple competitive technology suppliers sets an upper limit to the positive correlation between market size and licensing that Pisano (1990) suggested. Therefore, a large market size diminishes the revenues generated by licensing technologies and make cooperative commercialization less appealing.
Building on insights from the market design literature (Roth, 2007, and 2008 ) and using the Licensing Executives Society's (LES) survey data, Agrawal, Cockburn, and Zhang (2015) examine three structural market characteristics and their impact on technology licensing. They demonstrate that market thickness, non-congestion, and safety can each influence technology licensing, in different stages. First, market thickness, i.e., the number of potential buyers and sellers of technology, can increase the likelihood of finding partners for licensing and cooperative commercialization of innovation. Second, bargaining frictions, e.g., the costs of due diligence of technology, can decrease the likelihood of firms' engagement in licensing activities. Finally, market safety, i.e., the extent to which firms avoid misrepresenting their technologies or expropriate innovations, can decrease disclosure concerns and, thus, increase the likelihood of licensing.
While analyzing the direct impact of such market characteristics on licensing rates is not within the purview of this study, I use insights from the Market Design literature to explore the heterogeneity across different markets and examine the differential impacts that owning patents in each market has on licensing rates. In particular, I investigate the interaction between the market thickness (from Market Design literature) and patent rights (from Market for Technology literature) in search for a combinatory understanding of the factors that shape the functioning of technology markets. Agrawal, Cockburn, and Zhang (2015) demonstrate that market safety only influences licensing success in the final stage of licensing -reaching an agreement. In this stage, the licensor has to reveal detailed information about the technology and the paradox of disclosure becomes salient. In the absence of strong IP rights, the parties may act strategically in disclosing information. On the one side, concerned about expropriation, the seller may hide crucial information, and on the other side, the buyer may have an incentive to expropriate the technology, both increasing the likelihood of licensing failure. When the market is thick, the licensee has better chances of finding an alternative supplier. For the licensor, however, a larger number of established firms could increase the risk of being expropriated. Therefore, in the case of weak appropriability, I expect the licensing deals to fail more frequently in thick markets relative to those in thin markets.
In thin markets, where alternative technology suppliers are sparse, established firms have an incentive to build a reputation for "fairness" and aim for long-term gains from external acquisition of innovation by creating an environment of mutual trust (Gans & Stern, 2003) . Overall, thus, I expect losing patents to affect the technology licensing activities of innovative firms in thicker markets more severely than that of innovator organizations in thinner markets.
Before describing the data and empirical methodology, I present a review of the evidence on licensing activities in the biopharmaceutical sector, especially in gene patents.
The Market for Technology in the Biopharmaceuticals
The Market for Technology scholars often consider the biopharmaceutical sector as an exemplary sector with a well-functioning market for technology. All the three criteria for a functioning technology market seem to be met in this sector. First, pharmaceutical firms, as the downstream commercializing companies, are highly dependent on patents for protecting their innovations. In Mansfield's (1986) survey of 100 randomly selected manufacturing firms, the pharmaceutical and chemical industries give the highest value to patents for protecting their inventions, viewing them responsible for 30 percent of innovative developments. Levin et al. (1987) echo these findings. In their survey, "drugs" is the only sector, among eighteen sectors, where firms deem product patents as the most effective method of appropriating innovations. The same observation is reported in other surveys, including Cohen et al. (2000) and Graham et al. (2009) .
Second, the complementary assets needed to commercialize biopharmaceutical innovations are extremely costly and difficult to replicate. In this sector, in order to enter the market, new products are required to go through multiple stages of testing and clinical trials at the U.S. Food & Drug Association (FDA). Martin et al. (2017) report that the median costs of the FDA clinical trials for therapeutic drugs are as follows: $3.4 million for Phase I study involving patients, $8.6 million for Phase II study, and $21.4 million for Phase III study. Considering the uncertainty around the success of new drugs, such enormous sunk costs can be far beyond the amount that smaller firms can spend on commercializing their innovations. In addition, having access to marketing channels could be challenging for non-established companies.
Finally, bargaining cost in biopharmaceuticals appears to be lower, on average, relative to other sectors. A key component of negotiation costs among potential technology buyers and sellers is the valuation of the innovation. In the biopharmaceuticals, innovations are often in the form of molecules and genetic compounds, with a well-defined chemical structure. This mitigates the opportunities for strategic actions and makes it much easier to evaluate the value of innovation.
Moreover, search and transaction costs for identifying and forging agreements could be lowered in the presence of intermediary institutions, such as venture capitalists (Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2002) . 
DATA AND METHODS
In this study, my goal is to investigate the direction and magnitude of the impact that losing patent rights has on firm's technology licensing activities. To do so, I exploit the Myriad case that suddenly and surprisingly invalidated patents on naturally-occurring genomic compounds. My empirical strategy is to build a dataset of the organizations that had at least one of their patents invalidated following the Myriad case, and compare their technology licensing activities before and after the case.
In my analysis, the central explanatory variable is "gene patent ratio", i.e., the share of gene patents in the entire patent portfolio of the organization. I use it as a proxy for the number of organizational innovations that after the Myriad case are not patent protected any longer. I intend to investigate whether owning patent rights affects technology licensing behavior in firms. It is worthy of note that the simple count of gene patents is not an appropriate measure in this setting, since larger firms may lose a considerable number of patents, but given their enormous patent portfolios, their activities may not be affected by the loss; whereas losing a small number of patents could be consequential for small firms.
This section describes the data construction, empirical methods, and summary statistics of the dataset. I build the dataset of the population of gene patent owners and match them with a sample of organizations that are not at risk of losing their patents after the Myriad case, but are similar to the "treated" organizations otherwise.
Data Construction
The first and most important step to create the intended dataset is to identify the patents that claim genomic sequences. Fortunately, there is a standard and straight-forward method to locate these patents. Since 1990, the USPTO requires the patent applicants who use genomic sequences in their innovations to submit the sequence, in the form of ATCG sequences, and enlist them with identification numbers in the form of "SEQ ID"s. For instance, one of Myriad's disputed patent claims was claim 1 of the patent "17Q-linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility gene" (Patent No.: 5747282) that reads: "An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2.". This feature allows for clear identification of the patented genomic sequences and their associated patent claims. In addition, the USPTO sends the list of granted patents that include genomic sequences in their documents to the National Center for Biotechnology Research (NCBI) on a weekly basis. NCBI stores these patented sequences in a publicly accessible database. As a first step, I download the entire set of patented genomic sequences, consisting of ~7 million sequences in ~45,000 patents.
Next, I select out the patented human genes from the universe of downloaded gene patents.
In this study, the primary outcome variable is the gene-based diagnostic tests for humans. Although limiting the sample to the human genome discards rich genomic data on other organisms, it helps in carefully linking patented genes with the diagnostic tests available for them. I identify the human gene sequences using a standard bioinformatics algorithm, named BLAST (Basic Local Alignment Search Tool). This procedure receives the nucleotide sequence, compares it with a database of human messenger RNA sequence, and provides the gene symbol and gene ID of the nucleotide sequence as the output. The outcome of this procedure, thus, is the entire set of gene symbols and IDs for the patented nucleotide sequences.
I exploit the population of gene patents assembled in the previous step to construct the sample of gene patent owner organizations. I count each patent assignee as a separate gene patent owner. Next, I match the gene patent assignee names with Thomson Reuters Cortellis's Competitive Intelligence database. Cortellis is a proprietary database that gathers data on biopharmaceutical firms from public records (e.g., company documents, press releases, regulatory filings, etc.) and then supplements them with data on therapeutic domains and technology types.
It contains detailed data on biopharmaceutical companies, including their size, age, market portfolio, technology portfolio, patent portfolio, etc.
In constructing the gene patent owners sample, the organizations should satisfy three conditions. First, the patent owner should be an organizational entity. In the context of Pfizer's patents were at risk of invalidation after the Myriad case. I assume, therefore, that the Myriad case has not affected Pfizer's commercialization strategies. Pfizer's financial data confirm the validity of this assumption. In the two-day window, before and after the Myriad case's ruling announcement, Pfizer's stock price does not significantly change (to be exact, it increases by 1.3 percent relative to NASDAQ index). In robustness checks, I relax this 1 percent threshold and find similar results. construct this measure to proxy both firm's size and technology intensity. Considering the survey evidence on the dependence of biopharmaceuticals on patents to protect their inventions, using patents to measure size and technology level seems appropriate in my setting. I also collect data on the establishment date of organizations from Cortellis and when needed, I manually search for the establishment dates. According to Marx, Gans, and Hsu (2014) , the firm's commercialization strategy may be dynamic -initially entering markets products to prove the validity of the technology and then switch back to licensing. Thus, I control for firms' age in my analysis. Finally, to control for organizational diversification, I add the number of technological classes and key therapeutic areas in which firms are active, both extracted from Cortellis. I use the therapeutic areas again later as interaction terms to further explore the relationship between market safety and thickness.
As described in Section 3.3, a simple regression model of licensing deals and gene patent ratio can be endogenous. To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, I match my group of "treated" gene patent owner organizations with a control group of organizations that do not own gene patents, but are otherwise similar to the treated group. Cortellis provides data on a large set of biomedical firms, almost 170,000 organizations, which allows for using standard matching methods to find similar organizations. Section 3.2 provides further descriptions and statistics of the constructed dataset. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the dataset of organizations with gene patents in their patent portfolio. As shown in Table 1 , the sample of gene patent owner organizations covers a diverse set of organizations, with gene patent ratios in the range of 1 percent up to two-thirds of the patent portfolio. An average gene patent owner has almost 10 percent of its patent portfolio on naturally-occurring genes. The sample contains different types of organization: for-profit firms comprise 71 percent of the sample, while the remaining 29 percent are non-profits, including universities, hospitals, and governmental agencies. An average organization is 71 years old.
Descriptive Statistics
Academic institutions are responsible for the relatively old age of the average organization. For the for-profit only sample, the average age is 36 with a standard deviation of 37 (not reported in the table). The sample is relatively diverse regarding patent portfolio size, with a minimum of 3 and maximum of 13,651 patents. An average firm has 309 patents. It also has 1 drug and in an average year signs 1 technology licensing deal. Finally, an average firm has developed technologies in 5 different technology classes and is active in 12 markets.
<Insert Table 1 here> As I will discuss in Section 3.3, the statistical models that I run on the sample of gene patent owners could be endogenous. To address the endogeneity issues, I match the sample with a control group of non-gene patent owners. Table 2 <Insert Table 2 here>
Model Specification
To estimate the firm's technology licensing rates, I specify the outcome variable as the logarithm of the successful annual technology licensing deals forged by any given firm plus one.
I use the logarithm function in the specification due to the skewed distribution of the outcome variable, which contains many zeros. Log transformation helps transform data to near-normal distribution. Employing an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model, I assume the log of firm's annual technology licensing deals ( ) to be a function of the firm's gene patent ratio (
) and other firm's control variables :
Where indexes the year and indexes the firm. In this set of analysis, I employ a difference-in-difference framework and study the licensing deals before and after the Myriad case. I assume that the Myriad case affects each organization proportional to the extent of its gene patent ratio, and leaves the organizations in the control group unaffected. Formally, I estimate the following model:
This model is similar to the endogenous model that I introduced previously, but this time I
run it for the matched sample, where is zero for the firms in the control group. The coefficient of will present the causal impact of firm's patents on its licensing activity. . Myriad Genetics, a Utah-based company, was one of the firms that owned patent rights over BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Mutations of these genes could help predict the susceptibility of patients to breast and ovarian cancer. Using its gene patents, Myriad developed BROCA tests, i.e., diagnostic tests for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, and was allegedly aggressive in enforcing its patent rights to create a nearly perfect monopoly over these tests (Blanton, 2002) .
In response to Myriad's alleged aggressive patent enforcement, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) started a campaign to invalidate Myriad's patent, which after a few decisions and appeals, was petitioned to the US Supreme Court with the question "are human genes patentable". On June 13, 2013 the US Supreme Court rendered verdict in the Myriad case and as part of the decision, declared that isolated genes are parts of nature and therefore are ineligible for patent protection. According to the American Medical Association, the ruling invalidated proprietary rights to over 6,000 isolated genes in humans alone, and thousands more in other organisms.
Given the relatively long history of gene patents and in particular the controversy around Myriad's patents, I should establish that the ruling over the Myriad case came at a surprise to the stakeholders. Otherwise, in case the outcome of the ruling was anticipated, the gene patent owners could change their activities and endogenously select into the groups with favorable outcomes.
To investigate the selection concerns, I first present the qualitative evidence that confirms the difficulty of anticipating the Supreme Court's decision on the case, after the hearing session.
Reports published after the case hearing shows that the Supreme Court justices seemed to be taking different positions on the issue of patent-eligibility of human genes. On May 14, 2013, Los Angeles invalidating patents and its implications: "I just don't think we can decide the case on the ground, 'Oh, don't worry about investment." Such disagreements in the hearing session imply that it is unlikely that the stakeholders could perfectly anticipate the decision prior to its announcement.
The quantitative evidence further suggests that the ruling was unexpected and consequential to the companies that owned gene patents. hinting towards its appropriateness to be used as a quasi-experiment setting. Table 3 for the gene patent owners sample and in Table 4 for the matched sample of treated and control groups. Column 1 in Table 3 presents Table 3 adds control variables for the firm's size and innovation intensity, patent portfolio size in logarithm, and the firm's age and age-squared. Controlling for these variables intensifies the gene patent ratio's coefficient. The control variables suggest that the larger and more mature firms are associated with higher rates of technology licensing. On average, 1 standard deviation increase in the size of the firm's patent portfolio is associated with a 4 percent increase in the technology licensing deals. This figure for each one year more of age is 0.4 percent.
RESULTS

Results are presented in
Column 3 introduces two more time-invariant control variables that capture the number of technology classes that the firm develops and the number of markets in which the firm is active, respectively. The coefficient of technology class count is positive and significant, suggesting that firms with one more technology class have 2 percent more chance to strike a licensing deal. This figure is negative, small, and insignificant for the firm's market portfolio. In this specification, the relationship between gene patent ratio and technology licensing deals remains negative and statistically significant. Finally, Column 4 adds the firm's fixed effects and year dummy variables to control for the variables that are constant within firms and panels. The estimate of the central variable, gene patent ratio, remains negative and significant at the 95 percent significance level.
The coefficient suggests that each standard deviation increase in the gene patent ratio is correlated with a 25 percent decrease in the likelihood of technology licensing.
<Insert Table 3 here> As stated in Section 3, the relationship between gene patent ratio and technology licensing deals could be endogenous. To alleviate the endogeneity concerns, I use coarsened-exact matching method (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012) and compare the technology licensing rates of the gene patent owner organizations with those of a control group, matched on observable characteristics. Table 4 presents the results of the analysis of this matched sample. Column 1 in Table 4 shows the result of a basic regression, employing a simple difference-in-difference framework, which merely contains the gene patent ratio in the model's right-hand side. The coefficient is strong and negative, confirming my theoretical prediction that losing patent rights diminishes the chances of licensing technologies out. Column 2 adds the firm's fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics, which although slightly decreases the magnitude of the effect, shows that the estimate remains statistically significant. Column 3 introduces the year dummy variables for the years 2010-2017 to control for the general time trends that affect all firms similarly. In this specification, as well, the coefficient of gene patent ration remains strong and negative. Finally, Column 4 adds the time-varying control variables, i.e., the size of the firm's patent portfolio, the firm's age, and the firm's age-squared. My estimate of interest in this more elaborate specification stays negative and significant as well. It suggests that a standard deviation increase in the gene patent ratio decreases the technology licensing rates by 8 percent, on average. I interpret this result as evidence of the negative impact that losing patent rights has on technology licensing deals.
Consistent with the theory and prior empirical studies on Markets for Technology, I present findings that show the role that patent rights play in establishing functioning markets for technology and shaping the firms' decision to engage in these markets.
<Insert Table 4 <Insert Figure 6 here> Finally, Figure 7 plots the coefficients of the market interaction terms against the size of those markets in logarithm. According to the theoretical arguments discussed in Section 2, I expect a negative relationship between the impact of patent rights on technology licensing and market size. In other words, I expect the licensing failures due to losing patent rights to be more severe in thick markets. The data, however, do not support this hypothesis. As shown in Figure 7 , the estimates do not present any meaningful relationship with market size. Although I can fit a Ushaped trend line to explain almost 20 percent of the 14 estimates, the trend appears to be mainly driven by two therapeutic markets: Musculoskeletal disease and Metabolic disorder. Therefore, I
am not currently able to reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between the estimates and market size. However, a potential avenue is to disaggregate therapeutic markets into subgroups. Increasing the number of therapeutic markets could help in finding trends in the data. I will present the results of this analysis in the next versions of the paper.
<Insert Figure 7 here> Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the robustness tests. First, I relax the earlier assumption that the gene patents of organizations should comprise at least 1 percent of their patent portfolio to be considered in the sample. Adding organizations with below 1 percent gene patents, I
replicate Table 2 by running regressions on the entire population of the gene patent owners. The replication results are presented in Table 5 . Unlike prior analyses, the coefficient of gene patent ratio is not significantly different from zero in Columns 1-3. I suspect this is due to the sizable amount of licensing activities in large companies that lost only a minuscule share of their patents after the Myriad case, but their licensing deals, not changed by the Myriad case, dominates the more severely affected organizations. This suspicion is supported by the results presented in Column 4 that adds the firm's fixed-effects and year dummy variables. In Column 4, the coefficient of gene patent ratio is negative and strong. Furthermore, its magnitude is similar to that of the coefficient of gene patent ratio reported in Table 2 . Since adding the firm's fixed-effects estimates the growth (or decay) of the explanatory variable and not just its size, I interpret this similarity as evidence for the argument that the technology licensing activities of very large firms are not affected by the Myriad case. The results of the main specification are robust to relaxing the 1 percent gene patent ratio condition.
In addition, to check the sensitivity of the results to the regression model, I employ a
Poisson model and re-run the regression for the more elaborate specification. The results of this regression are listed in Table 5 , Column 5. Consistent with prior analysis, the coefficient of gene patent ratio is negative and statistically significant. I report the incidence-rate ratios in brackets.
The estimate in Column 5 suggests that losing 1 standard deviation of the patent portfolio is associated with 18 percent less technology licensing deals.
<Insert Table 5 here> Table 6 presents the results of the robustness check for the CEM sample. One of my concerns with the difference-in-difference analysis is that the outlier data in both extremes have generated the strong results. To make sure this is not the case and the negative impact of patent invalidation on technology licensing deal is salient throughout the sample, I separate my matched sample in two sub-samples based on the organization's patent portfolio size: I run the same difference-in-difference analyses for organizations with 10 patents and fewer, and those with more than 10 patents, separately. Since patent portfolio size was one of the variables on which I matched my sample, such a separation should not bias the results towards on end. Table 6 presents the results of the difference-in-difference framework for the two separate samples.
<Insert Table 6 here> Column 1 in Table 6 presents the estimates of the difference-in-difference analysis for the organizations with 10 or fewer patents, while Column 2 reports similar estimates for the organizations with more than 10 patents. Consistent with prior results, the estimates of gene patent ratio are both negative. Since I cut the sample in half, the number of observations shrank significantly for each model leading to a decrease in the statistical significance of the estimates.
Nonetheless, both estimates are significant at the 90 percent level. I interpret these results as evidence of a real impact of patents on licensing rates, which is not driven by outliers at the two extremes. Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the robustness tests. First, I relax the earlier assumption that the gene patents of organizations should comprise at least 1 percent of their patent portfolio to be considered in the sample. Adding organizations with below 1 percent gene patents, I replicate that adds the firm's fixed-effects and year dummy variables. In Column 4, the coefficient of gene patent ratio is negative and strong. Furthermore, its magnitude is similar to that of the coefficient of gene patent ratio reported in Table 2 . Since adding the firm's fixed-effects estimates the growth (or decay) of the explanatory variable and not just its size, I interpret this similarity as evidence for the argument that the technology licensing activities of very large firms are not affected by the Myriad case. The results of the main specification are robust to relaxing the 1 percent gene patent ratio condition.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Nonetheless, both estimates are significant at the 90 percent level. I interpret these results as evidence of a real impact of patents on licensing rates, which is not driven by outliers at the two extremes. Hall & Ziedonis, 2001 ). In this current version of the paper, I have not been able to make such a precise distinction among the firms in my sample. One research avenue is to identify these different types of organizations and examine the similarities and differences of the roles that patents play in the cooperative activities of each group.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
CONCLUSION
The last two decades have witnessed a growing interest in the markets for technologies and ideas, and the factors that help the functioning of these markets. Notably, the scholars have recently This study also is an endeavor to combine two related but separate views on Market for
Technology: one that considers IP rights, complementary assets, and bargaining costs as the factors shaping the technology markets, and another one that focuses on the structural market characteristics to examine the markets for technologies and ideas. Although at this stage, I do not find a meaningful relationship between the IP rights from the first perspective and market thickness from the second, this study calls for further theoretical and empirical work to explore the connections between the two perspectives. Such efforts can deepen our understanding of technology markets and how they work. 
